Big events from an insurer's perspective

Quite apart from people being injured or killed, the outbreak of a mass panic at an international sporting event has far-reaching consequences. The event has to be interrupted and the potential for third-party losses is great. Claims can be made against the organisers, organisations or stadium operators.

From an insurer's perspective, examples of insurance classes that can be involved in a claims event include abandonment of events, general liability and facility owners' liability insurance as well as event liability, liability for pure financial loss, personal accident and life insurance.

The risk and even the consequences of a mass panic are still sometimes severely underestimated. Whilst applicable laws are satisfied when events are planned, a new stadium is built or an old structure refurbished, there are currently no regulations governing the prevention of panic situations. The systematic recording and handling of any risk potentials is an area of risk perception that remains neglected until today.

Preventive measures at the planning stage

There are many preventive measures that can be taken at the planning stage of a big event. With innovative risk management, problems can be identified early on, evaluated, and appropriate measures taken to minimise dangers.

The introduction of an additional certification process ("Safe big events") or the appointment of a stadium risk manager (SRM) (these risk management features are yet to be introduced) could go some way to ensuring the high standard of risk management in stadiums at big events in the long term.

Risk factors and risk minimisation

The list of risk minimisation measures is long and can only be presented in excerpts here:

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  Efficient traffic routes, parking management systems or entrances and exits which prevent rival fans meeting, as well as sufficiently secure parking facilities within the stadium complex, e.g. for team buses, the media and other VIPs. All this ensures controlled arrival and departure on the day of the event.
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  Emergency evacuation routes must be sufficiently available, appropriate in size and well signposted. Plans for an evacuation must be developed long before the event actually begins, made known to all groups concerned (e.g. emergency and security staff) and practised and coordinated on a regular basis.
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  Where possible, stadiums should have an inner and an outer perimeter preventing unauthorised access. These have to be able to withstand the pressure generated by large crowds, but it must also be possible to open them quickly when necessary by means of large gates.
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  Body searches and the design of the spectator blocks and seating, entries to and exits from the blocks, public information symbols (pictograms and signs) and state-of-the-art communication and surveillance systems all help ensure the event goes smoothly. In addition, extensive building regulations and approval procedures as well as the recommendations of FIFA, UEFA and the national football association are intended to improve safety at football matches.

Terrorism risks

Besides hooligans and radical right-wing fans, terrorism risks have become part of risk management. At the very latest since the attacks in Madrid, terror has become a risk to be taken seriously even in Europe.

The organisers of the 2004 UEFA European Football Championship in Portugal, for example, stepped up security measures to a correspondingly dramatic extent. AWACS reconnaissance aircraft manned by NATO were deployed almost around the clock together with the Portuguese air force to circle over the venues.

In the first week alone, the planes used approximately 150,000 litres of kerosene in order to protect the grounds from potential acts of terrorism from the air. AWACS aircraft have been used again at the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany.